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LEGAL SHORTS

RECENT DECISIONS AFFECTING THE
MONTANA PRACTITIONER
1.

NATIVE ECOSYSTEMS COUNCIL V. UNITED STATES
FOREST SERVICE1

In Native Ecosystems Council v. United States Forest Service,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the United States District Court for the District of Montana's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Forest Service. 2 Native Ecosystems claimed that the Forest Service violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the National Forest
Management Act (NFMA) by approving the Jimtown Vegetation
Project (Jimtown Project) in the Helena National Forest. 3
The Helena National Forest comprises almost one million
acres in western Montana, and many parts of the forest consist of
dry ponderosa pine stands. 4 Over the past ninety years, the Forest Service has prevented periodic low-intensity fires, a practice
which has resulted in "dense stocking and intense competition for
moisture and nutrients on these sites." 5 The current conditions,
due to the prevention of periodic low-intensity fires, have increased the likelihood of large, stand-replacing, high intensity
fires in the area. 6 In 2003, while this case was pending in the
district court, a wildfire burned one-thousand acres in the area,
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

428 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1235.
Id.
Id. at 1236.
Id.
Id.
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including 370 acres of land which were slated for management in
7
the Jimtown Project.
The Jimtown Project is intended to lower the risk of catastrophic fire through the use of thinning, prescribed burning and
weed management on approximately 1,500 acres of forest.8 The
project area is also located within 150 yards of a nesting area for a
pair of northern goshawks, a designated sensitive species. 9 The
Forest Service prepared a Biological Evaluation to consider the
impact of the Jimtown Project on the goshawks and concluded
that the project "may impact individuals or habitat but [is] unlikely to contribute to a trend towards Federal listing or cause a
loss of viability to the population or species." 10 The evaluation
also noted that a stand-replacing fire would pose a grave risk to
the goshawks if the Forest Service failed to take action."
The Forest Service next prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA) which incorporated the goshawk findings from the Biological Evaluation. The EA noted that while the Jimtown area
does not include any old growth, the Jimtown Project will contribute to the development of old growth in the area, consistent with
the requirements of the Forest Plan for the Helena National Forest.' 2 The Forest Service considered comments in response to the
EA, including comments from Native Ecosystems, and then issued
a Decision Notice and Finding of No Significant Impact (Decision

Notice). 13
The Decision Notice noted that the Forest Service decided not
to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in addition
to the EA, in part because it had already prepared an EIS for a
substantially similar project, the Bull-Sweats Project, about four
miles from the Jimtown Project.' 4 The Forest Service concluded
that goshawks continued to nest in the Bull-Sweats Project area
after the fire management project was completed, and reasoned
that similar results would ensue in the Jimtown area. 15 The Decision Notice also included an amendment to the Helena National
Forest Plan (Forest Plan), reducing the hiding cover/road density
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Native Ecosystems, 428 F.3d at 1238.
Id. at 1235.
Id. at 1236.
Id.
Id. at 1237.
Id.
Native Ecosystems, 428 F.3d at 1237.
Id.
Id.
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standard designed to protect big game in the Jimtown Project area
by three percent. 16 Under either the Jimtown Project Plan, or the
no-action alternative, the area would be out of compliance with
17
the Forest Plan if the amendment was not made.
Native Ecosystems filed an administrative appeal, which was
denied, and then filed suit in Montana federal court in 2001.18
The district court granted the Forest Service's motion for summary judgment, rejecting Native Ecosystem's claim that the Forest Service violated NEPA by failing to consider reasonable alternatives to the Jimtown Project. The district court also rejected the
claim that the Forest Service violated NFMA by arbitrarily and
capriciously concluding that the Jimtown Project would not impact goshawk habitat, and in deciding not to prepare an EIS on
goshawk impact. 19
NEPA and NFMA claims are reviewed under the Administrative Procedure Act, and an agency decision may be set aside if it is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law."20 NEPA requires an EIS for "major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of human environment[,]" 2 1 but permits a Decision Notice in lieu of an EIS if the
agency concludes that there is no significant effect from the proposed project in the EA.22 Under NEPA, the court must determine whether the Forest Service took a "hard look" at the potential effects of the project. 23 NFMA imposes substantive requirements on the Forest Service to ensure that habitat is managed to
maintain viable populations of existing wildlife, 24 a duty which
"applies with special force" to sensitive species. 2 5
Native Ecosystems argued that the Forest Service violated
NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS for the Jimtown Project and
failing to consider a range of alternatives. 26 With respect to the
16. Id. at 1237-38.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1238.
19. Native Ecosystems, 428 F.3d at 1238.
20. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A) (2005)).
21. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2005)).
22. Id. at 1239.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1249 (citing Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Serv., 137 F.3d
1372, 1376 (9th Cir. 1998); construing 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (2005)).
25. Native Ecosystems, 428 F.3d at 1249 (citing Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 1996)).
26. Id. at 1239, 1245.
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preparation of the EIS, the court examined three factors relevant
to the significance of the project:
1) '[t]he degree to which the effects on the quality of the human environment are likely to be highly controversial ... ;27
2) '[t]he degree to which the possible effects on the human environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks
•'28 and
3) '[wlhether the action is related to other actions with
individually
29
insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts.'
With respect to the first factor, the court found that the Forest Service considered adverse impacts, but such information did
not automatically make the project "highly controversial." 30 Regarding the second factor, the court concluded that the Forest Service's reliance on the Bull-Sweats Project EIS and monitoring of
the effects of management practices in that area defeated Native
Ecosystems's attempts to characterize the Jimtown Project's impact as highly uncertain. 3 1 Finally, the court concluded that the
Forest Service adequately considered cumulative effects with
32
quantified and detailed information.
With respect to the consideration of a range of alternatives,
the court determined that the Forest Service considered reasonable alternatives consistent with the stated purpose of the Jimtown
Project's goals of reducing fire risk, controlling weeds and providing wood. 33 The court noted that the Forest Service initially considered six proposed plans, but only two - the proposed project
and the no-action alternative - were given detailed consideration. 3 4 The court found that NEPA only requires consideration of
"appropriate" alternatives, consideration of a no-action alternative, and designation of a preferred alternative, and does not dictate a minimum number of alternatives to consider. 35 The court
also rejected Native Ecosystems' attempts to raise questions about
the substance of the plans considered, noting that its proposed alternatives would be inconsistent with the goals of the Jimtown
36
Project of' redundant with the "no-action" plan.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 1239 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(4) (2000)).
Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(5) (2000)).
Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7) (2000)).
Id. at 1240-41.
Native Ecosystems, 428 F.3d at 1243.
Id. at 1244.
Id. at 1247, 1249.
Id. at 1245.
Id. at 1245-46.
Id. at 1248-49.
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Native Ecosystems also argued that the Forest Service failed
to comply with the substantive requirements of the NFMA by failing to discuss forest-wide goshawk population trends and the impact the Jimtown Project would have on these trendsA7 The court
explained that the Forest Service may "avoid studying the population trends of the Indicator Species by using Indicator Species
habitat as a proxy for Indicator Species population trends in a socalled 'proxy on proxy' approach. Crucial to this approach, however, is that the methodology for identifying the habitat proxy be
sound." 38 The court found no flaws in the Forest Service's methodology and concluded that the Forest Service satisfied NFMA's
39
species viability requirements.
In summary, the court found that while there may be some
risk to goshawk habitat, the Forest Service considered such shortterm risks and adequately balanced them against the long-term
benefits of preventing a stand-replacing fire. 40 This opinion illustrates the high bar set by the "arbitrary and capricious" standard
of the Administrative Procedures Act, and the court's emphasis on
the Forest Service's compliance with procedure as set forth in the
applicable statutes.
Moriah Gillis

2.

41
IN RE R.L.H.

In In re R.L.H., as a matter of first impression, the Montana
Supreme Court addressed whether the presence of a controlled
substance in a person's blood or urine constitutes sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove prior possession beyond a reasona42
ble doubt.
In September 2002, R.L.H., a youth, violated the terms of her
probation by using and possessing marijuana. The Youth Court
classified her as a delinquent youth, reinstated her probation, and
placed her in shelter care. 4 3 On December 23, 2002, the Missoula
County Attorney filed a Second Petition to Revoke R.L.H.'s probation, alleging that she ran away from shelter care and tested posi37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Native Ecosystems, 428 F.3d at 1249.
Id. at 1251.
Id.
Id.
2005 MT 177, 327 Mont. 520, 116 P.3d 791.
Id.
1-4.
Id.
7.
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tive, via a urinalysis administered on December 19, 2002, for illegal drugs, including methamphetamine, opiates, and marijuana.
In early January 2003, R.L.H. appeared in Youth Court with her
counsel and admitted using methamphetamine. R.L.H. made her
admission on the condition that the County Attorney would recommend a treatment program as a disposition. The court ordered
R.L.H. to treatment at Shodair Hospital, where she received treat44
ment until she ran away on February 14, 2003.
In March 2003, the Missoula County Attorney filed a Third
Petition to Revoke her probation, alleging that R.L.H. committed
felony possession of methamphetamine, felony possession of
opiates, and misdemeanor possession of marijuana. The County
Attorney based the charges in the petition on both the urinalysis
test and R.L.H.'s admission in open court.4 5 The County wished to
place R.L.H. in a youth detention facility at this time, and in order
to do so, the State had to find her guilty of an offense that would
46
constitute a felony if committed by an adult.
R.L.H. filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing possession by ingestion or consumption failed to meet Montana's statutory definition
of possession of a dangerous drug. R.L.H. also filed a motion to
prevent the introduction of her admissions. 47 The court denied all
of R.L.H.'s motions, and a jury found her guilty of all three
charges. The Youth Court committed R.L.H. to the custody of the
Department of Corrections for placement at a secure youth deten48
tion facility.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court addressed two issues. The first issue was whether a positive urinalysis was sufficient evidence to prove R.L.H. constructively possessed a controlled substance. The second issue was whether R.L.H.'s admission to methamphetamine use was a voluntary statement, and
therefore admissible evidence to use against her to prove the fel49
ony possession charge.
To determine the first issue, the court looked at the statutory
definition of "possession." Montana Code Annotated section 45-2101(58) defines "possession" as "the knowing control of anything
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. IT 8-9.
Id.
Id.
10 (citing MONT. CODE ANN.§§ 41-5-341(1); 41-5-206(1)(b)(x) (2003)).
In re R.L.H., 9 11-12.
Id. 9114.
Id. 1 17, 30.
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for a sufficient time to be able to terminate control." 50 Possession
can be either actual or constructive. 5 1 R.L.H. argued that she did
not have control over the drugs and therefore could not meet the
definition of constructive possession. She further argued, and the
court agreed, that once a substance is ingested and assimilated
into the bloodstream, the person who ingested the substance
ceases to exercise dominion or control over the substance. 52 However, the court also concluded that a urinalysis or blood test indicating the presence of an illegal substance in the body constitutes
circumstantial evidence of a prior possession of that substance,
based on the theory that the person must have possessed it for
3
even a short period of time before ingesting it.5
The court then looked at the elements of knowing and voluntary, which are needed to prove criminal possession of a dangerous drug. The State must prove the person charged with the offense was aware that he or she possessed the drug or was aware of
the high probability that the substance was a dangerous drug. In
addition, the State must show that the defendant voluntarily ingested the drug. Although the court concluded that the presence
of a drug in one's body constitutes circumstantial evidence of prior
possession of the substance, that evidence alone is not enough to
sustain a conviction for possession because it does not establish
54
that the substance was knowingly and voluntarily ingested.
Therefore, the presence of a controlled substance in a person's
blood or urine is adequate to prove prior possession only when accompanied by other corroborating evidence to show that the accused knowingly and voluntarily possessed the drug. 5 5 An admission of drug use would constitute the needed corroborating evi56
dence.
R.L.H. admitted using methamphetamine in January 2003 in
exchange for being placed in a treatment facility. This admission,
along with the positive drug test, provided the direct evidence the
State needed to prove that R.L.H. knowingly and voluntarily possessed methamphetamine. 5 7 However, because R.L.H. did not admit to using opiates or marijuana, although she tested positive for
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. [18.
Id.
Id. $91 19, 23.
In re R.L.H.,
Id. IT24-26.
Id.
26.
Id.
Id. [28.

23.
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them, the State had no corroborating evidence to support the
urinalysis test. Therefore, the court reversed and dismissed the
charges of felony possession of opiates and misdemeanor posses58
sion of marijuana.
The second issue the court addressed was whether R.L.H.'s
admission to using methamphetamine was a voluntary statement
and should have been admitted as the evidence that ended up corroborating the urinalysis and convicting her. R.L.H. argued the
admission should have been excluded from evidence because she
was not advised it could later be used against her. 59 She claimed
the State put her in a position where she felt compelled to admit
the offense.6 0 According to the United States Constitution and the
Montana Constitution, the privilege against self-incrimination
does not attach if the State has not compelled a person to respond. 6 1 In addition, if a person fails to assert the privilege, she
may lose the benefit of the privilege without making a knowing
62
and intelligent waiver.
In this case, at the time R.L.H. made the admission, the State
had not filed the charges of criminal possession of
methamphetamine, nor did it intend to do so. Rather, the State
sought the admission in order to revoke R.L.H.'s probation and
send her to treatment. At the time R.L.H. admitted to using
methamphetamine, she was aware that the court would revoke
her probation, place her in a treatment center, and possibly restrict her liberty.6 3 She admitted to using the drug in exchange
for a recommendation for placement in Shodair for treatment, although at that time, she could have remained silent. 64 She had
been informed of her right to remain silent before she made the
admission, and as the court stated, "R.L.H. was in a classic plea
bargain situation." 65 The court found the State did not place
R.L.H. in a position where she was coerced into waiving her right
not to incriminate herself. Therefore, R.L.H.'s admission to using
methamphetamine was voluntary and admissible as evidence. 66
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
29.
In re R.L.H.,
Id.
33.
Id.
32.
Id.
Id.
36.
Id.
38.
In re R.L.H.,
Id. H 38-39.

31.

37-38.
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In her dissent, Justice Cotter argued that the State compelled
R.L.H. to confess to using methamphetamine because, if she had
not, the State would have recommended that the court revoke her
probation and incarcerate her. In addition, the State never advised R.L.H. that her statement could be used to support criminal
proceedings should she violate the terms of her probation. 67 Finally, Justice Cotter argued that the State made a representation
that it failed to honor when it affirmed that it would not seek a
determination that she committed the possession offense. Justice
Cotter concluded that the State should have properly informed
R.L.H. that if she failed to comply with the terms of probation her
incriminating statements could be used against her to support ad68
ditional charges.
This case sets the standard for what is necessary to prove possession of a dangerous drug under Montana law when a drug test
shows the presence of dangerous substances in the body. The
Montana Supreme Court establishes a middle ground by determining that the presence of a controlled substance in a person's
blood or urine is not sufficient to determine possession unless
there is corroborating evidence to show that the accused knowingly and voluntarily possessed the drug. However, the court's
analysis of voluntary statements raises serious concerns because
it demonstrates the court's willingness to find a voluntary confession when circumstances suggest otherwise.
Elizabeth Lowrance

3.

STATE V. DAMON

69

In State v. Damon, the Montana Supreme Court addressed
the issue of the admissibility of a criminal defendant's Preliminary Breath Test (PBT) as substantive trial evidence. The court
was also faced with assessing whether a defendant's statements,
made in the absence of a police officer's direct questioning, were
admissible at trial, and whether the defendant was properly des70
ignated as a persistent felony offender.
After observing David Damon driving erratically in the evening hours of December 2002 in Cascade Country, a law enforce67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. T 48 (Cotter, J., dissenting).
Id. T 50.
2005 MT 218, 328 Mont. 276, 119 P.3d 1194.
Id. 9 1-5.
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ment officer made an investigatory stop of Damon's vehicle. The
officer approached Damon and noticed a strong odor of alcohol on
his breath as well as Damon's slurred speech. As a result of these
observations, the officer conducted a series of field sobriety tests
on Damon to verify his suspicion that Damon was drunk.7 1 During the course of these tests, Damon blurted out "just give me a
DUI," and "I'm already drunk."72 After the officer concluded the
field tests, he administered a PBT, which revealed Damon's blood
alcohol content (BAC) to be 0.274, nearly three times the legal
limit.7 3 The officer then placed Damon under arrest and took him
to the station to participate in a second breath test, which was not
74
performed due to Damon's belligerent behavior.
The State charged Damon with one count of driving under the
influence of alcohol (DUI), fourth or subsequent offense; driving
while privilege to do so is suspended or revoked; no insurance; and
disorderly conduct. 75 The prosecutor also timely filed a notice of
intent to treat Damon as a persistent felony offender for his prior

DUI conviction in January

1999.76

A preliminary hearing was held to determine whether the
PBT results would be admissible at trial in which both the State
and Damon presented expert testimony on its reliability. The
trial court issued an order admitting the PBT results into evidence based on a finding that the results were sufficiently reliable
and accurate. 77 Damon also moved to suppress his statements
made during the officer's investigatory stop based on the officer's
failure to advise him as to the nature of the stop as required by a
now repealed statute.7 8 The court granted his motion in part, but
allowed in the statements "just give me a DUI," and "I'm already
drunk." The trial court held Damon's trial in December 2003. The
jury convicted him and designated him a persistent felony offender; he was sentenced to ten years, with five years suspended
79
on the DUI charge on March 10, 2004.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court was faced with three
issues: 1) did the trial court err in admitting the PBT results as
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Damon,
Id.
Id.
8.

7.

78. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-402(4) (2001) (repealed 2003).

79. Damon, % 10.
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substantive evidence at trial; 2) did the trial court err in admitting
Damon's statements made to the police officer in spite of the officer's failure to recite required advisories; and 3) was the trial
80
court permitted to treat Damon as a persistent felony offender.
On the issue of the admission of the PBT results, the court
gave notice to three prior decisions concerning PBT admissibility.81 In each of those cases, the court held PBT results to be inadmissible as evidence at trial due to insufficient proof of their scientific reliability and accuracy.8 2 In this case, the court found the
trial court had not abused its discretion in admitting the PBT results because there had been sufficient expert testimony
presented by the State to prove the accuracy and reliability of the
PBT results as an indicator of a person's BAC.8 3 The State's expert witness testified that the PBT instrument had an error rate
that fell in the ten percent range, but most often had an error rate
around five percent.8 4 The court found that applying a ten percent error rate to Damon's BAC would still show that he was well
over the legal limit for a DUI.8 5 The court distinguished this case
from its prior holdings in Strizich, Weldele, and Snell based on its
preference to admit relevant scientific evidence to let the jury
weigh for itself,8 6 and on its explicit holding in Weldele that if the
State "establishes that the PBT results it seeks to admit are reliable and accurate, the results could then be admissible if they oth87
erwise satisfy all other requirements for admissibility."
The court also found that the trial court had not abused its
discretion in admitting the statements made by Damon during the
investigatory stop. The court articulated that although the statute required an officer to inform a person whom the officer has
stopped of the nature of the stop, the officer must only do so before
questioning that person.8 8 Applying this requirement, the court
found that the statements were properly admitted because Damon
uttered them spontaneously, without being questioned by the of80. Id.
13, 30, 34.
81. Id. 1 1 (citing State v. Strizich, 286 Mont. 1, 952 P.2d 1365 (1997)); State v.
Weldele, 2003 MT 117, 315 Mont. 452, 69 P.3d 1162; State v. Snell, 2004 MT 334, 324
Mont. 173, 103 P.3d 503).
57-58; Snell, 37.
82. See Strizich, 286 Mont. at 12, 952 P.2d at 1372; Weldele,
83. Damon, 27.
84. Id.
25.
85. Id.
27.
86. See Barmeyer v. Montana Power Co., 202 Mont. 185, 193-94, 657 P.2d 594, 598
(1983).
87. Damon, 21 (citing Weldele, 57).
31 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-402(4) (2001) (repealed 2003)).
88. Id.
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ficer; therefore the officer was not yet required to give Damon
89
such advisories.
The court agreed with the trial court's judgment in treating
Damon as a persistent felony offender. It based its holding on the
wording of the persistent felony offender statute, which allows for
such a designation when the underlying charge meets the definition of a felony and the State provides proper notice of its intent to
seek such designation, 90 which were both present in this case. 9 1
The majority ignored the dissent's insistence on the invalid application of the persistent felony offender statute based on amendments to the state's DUI statutes because the majority felt these
amendments had done nothing to change the effect of the persistent felony offender statute. 9 2 The majority affirmed Damon's
conviction without any modification based on its finding that the
93
trial court had not abused its discretion.
Justice Cotter filed a dissenting opinion on the issue of admissibility of PBT results, which Justice Nelson joined. Her dissent
was based on her concern that there was an insufficient showing
of the accuracy and reliability of the PBT results. She argued that
the court had previously found that such results were unreliable
indicators of guilt.9 4 Justice Cotter was also concerned that the
majority's holding would lead to a reduced use of the more reliable, non-portable Intoxilyzer 5000 machines. 95
Justice Nelson filed a separate dissenting opinion on the issue
of the application of the persistent felony offender statute, which
Justice Cotter joined. He argued that the court erred in failing to
apply the sentencing restrictions for DUI convictions in Montana
Code Annotated section 61-8-731. Justice Nelson argued that the
court should have applied this section instead of the persistent felony offender statute because it is in line with the intent of the
legislature to refrain from incarcerating DUI convicts for long pe96
riods of time in favor of placing them in rehabilitation.
The court's decision in Damon is important to criminal law
practitioners because it marks the first time the court has allowed
the admission of PBT results as substantive evidence of a defen89. Id. f 33.
90.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-13-108 (2001).

Damon, 37.
Id.
39.
Id. 9[41.
Id.
45 (Cotter, J., dissenting).
Id.
60.
79-80 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
Id.
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dant's guilt in a DUI case. In doing so, the court did not overrule
its prior holdings in cases raising the same issue, but rather distinguished Damon on the facts that in this case the government
had met its burden in establishing the accuracy and reliability of
the PBT result as a showing of Damon's guilt. The only factor the
court set forth in determining whether the requisite accuracy and
reliability had been met was whether the evidence can pass a Rule
702, Montana Rules of Evidence analysis, leaving the admissibility of PBT results up to a battle of the experts.
Brad J. Brown
4.

THE MONTANA STATE LEGISLATURE'S RESPONSE TO COLUMBIA
97
FALLS ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 6 v. STATE

In Columbia Falls Elementary School District No. 6 v. State,
the Montana Supreme Court was called upon to determine
whether the state courts had the authority to determine the constitutionality of the existing state public school administration
and funding system under the Montana Constitution, and if it did
have this authority, whether the legislature's funding scheme had
fulfilled its constitutionally mandated duty to provide "quality"
education to Montana public school students. 98
The existing education funding system at issue was instituted
in response to a previous Montana Supreme Court decision, Helena Elementary School District No. 1 v. State,9 9 in which the
court held that disparities in state spending among school districts violated Article X, Section 1(1) of the Montana Constitution
by denying students equal educational opportunity. 10 0 In 1993, to
remedy the lack of equal opportunity as determined by the court,
the legislature created a "general fund" for each school district,
which includes a lump sum state contribution, state contribution
based on student enrollment, funds raised locally, and special education funds. 10 1 Under this funding scheme, school district spending is limited by built-in minimum and maximum expenditures
10 2
calculated for each district based on a formula.
97. 2005 MT 69, 326 Mont. 304, 109 P.3d 257 (2005).
98. Id.
3-5; MONT. CONST. art. 10, § 1(3) (1972).
99. 236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684 (1989).

100. Columbia Falls Elementary, T 23.
101. Id. $ 24; MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-9-307(3) (1993) (repealed 2005).
102. Columbia Falls Elementary,

24; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 20-9-308(1) & -308(3)

(2005).
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In 2004, individual parents of minor children attending Montana public schools and a coalition of education groups and school
districts throughout the state brought an action in the state district court against the State alleging that the 1993 funding
scheme and administration of public school education for grades
K-12 was still constitutionally deficient because it failed to "provide a basic system of free quality public elementary and secondary schools." 10 3 The plaintiffs complained that the 1993 funding
scheme was uncorrelated to the constitutionally mandated "quality" standard, that term having been left undefined by the legislature.1 0 4 As a result, most school districts were operating at or
near their allowed maximum budget under the general fund,
while often failing to meet accreditation standards, losing good
teachers because of low pay and insufficient benefits, cutting essential school programs, struggling with deteriorating facilities,
and juggling insufficient funds between general and special education. 10 5 Moreover, the plaintiffs asserted that state administration of public education had further failed its constitutional mandate in failing to "recognize the distinct and unique cultural heritage of the American Indians and... show [ing] no commitment in
its educational goals to the preservation of Indian cultural identity," as provided for in Article X, Section 1(2) of the Constitution. 10 6 The district court held in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that the state funding and administration scheme failed to
provide students with a quality education and to recognize American Indian cultural heritage, and thus violated Article X of the
Montana Constitution. 10 7 The State appealed to the Montana Supreme Court on the grounds that the plaintiffs' challenge to the
sufficiency of the State's funding of public education under the
Constitution was a non-justiciable political question because Arti08
cle X, Section 1(3) is a non-self-executing, legislative directive.
The Montana Supreme Court held that although Article X,
Section 1(3) is non-self-executing because it addresses the legislature in the language "[tihe legislature shall provide," rather than
103. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, Columbia Falls Elementary Sch.
Dist. No. 6 v. State, 2005 MT 69, 326 Mont. 304, 109 P.3d 257 (No. BDV-2002-528), 2004
WL 844055; MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(3) (1972) (emphasis added).
104. Columbia Falls Elementary, T 25.
105. Id. T 29.
106. Id. 1 35.
107. Id.
108. Id. T 13.
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addressing the courts, it is still a justiciable question.' 0 9 Read in
conjunction with Article X, Section 1(1), which provides a right to
education, the quality education clause creates an individual
right, and the courts, as "final interpreters of the Constitution,
have the final 'obligation to guard, enforce, and protect every right
110
granted or secured by the Constitution."'
In thus considering whether the State had provided quality
education, the court refused to base its assessment on output measures, such as Montana students' acceptable performance on standardized tests, seeing such measures as not reflecting the broader
goals of education and not necessarily reflective of the level of
quality provided by the State.'
Instead, the court examined input, the existing funding scheme, and found that it had omitted
educational quality considerations in two fundamental ways.
First, the legislature passed the funding bill without defining
1 2
"quality" or assessing what a quality education might require.
Second, the funding scheme created was not based on any particular factors that could provide for a quality education. 1 3 Specifically, the legislature had failed to address inflation, teacher pay,
accreditation requirements, fixed costs, and the cost of providing
special education. 1 14 The court concluded that "[uinless funding
relates to needs such as academic standards, teacher pay, fixed
costs, costs of special education, and performance standards, then
the funding is not related to the cornerstones of a quality education," and thus the funding scheme had not satisfied its constitutional mandate. 1 5 As such, the court directed the legislature to
undertake to define a "quality" education, and in so doing to remedy those deficiencies complained of by the plaintiffs in order to
6
create a public school system that is constitutionally sufficient."
Further, on a separate issue, the court upheld the district court's
finding that the State had not committed itself to recognizing and
preserving American Indian culture through the education system

109. Id.
17.
110. Columbia Falls Elementary, 18 (quoting Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637
(1884)).
111. Id.
30.
112. Id.
25.
113. Id.
114. Id.
26.
115. Id.
116. Columbia Falls Elementary, [ 31.
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as required by Article X, Section 1(2) of the Montana Constitu7
tion."i
During the 2005 regular session of the Montana State Legislature, that body undertook to meet its responsibility to the state
public education system as directed by the court. On April 7,
2005, Governor Brian Schweitzer signed into law legislation introduced by Senator Don Ryan, Senate Bill No. 152, "An Act Defining
'Basic System of Free Quality Public Elementary and Secondary
Schools' As Required by Article X, Section 1(3), of the Montana
Constitution."' " 8
The bill first established basic legislative goals in support of
providing a quality education, committing the legislature to creating in the public school system a "learning environment that: 1)
furthers the ability to reason critically and creatively; 2) fosters
the ability to effectively communicate ideas, knowledge, and
thoughts; 3) develops a sense of personal and civic responsibility;
4) develops a strong work ethic, postsecondary readiness, and employment skills; and 5) encourages a healthy lifestyle." 1 9
Second, the bill responded directly to the Montana Supreme
Court and created law that defined the parameters of a quality
education. 20 It recognized that state accreditation standards are
the minimum standards of a quality education, and that quality
education must be comprised of programs serving students with
special needs, curricula addressing American Indian culture and
heritage, availability of qualified teachers, uniform standards for
quality in school facilities and distance learning, transportation,
procedures to "assess and track student achievement" in meeting
accreditation standards, special education and Indian curricula,
12
and preservation of local control of the various school districts. '
Third, also in direct response to the court, the bill enumerated
the minimum factors which the legislature must consider in creating a funding formula for quality education, including student
population, the needs of urban and rural schools, the needs of students with special needs, the needs of Indian students, and "the
ability of school districts to attract and retain qualified educators
22
and other personnel."'
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. T135.
2005 Mont. Laws 674.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-1-102 (2005).
Id. § 20-9-309.
Id. § 20-9-309 (2)(a)-(h).
Id. § 20-9-309(3)(a)-(f).
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Fourth, the bill committed the legislature to the task of assessing the costs and establishing a funding formula that considered all of these education quality factors by July 1, 2007, with a
provision that every ten years following the legislature must reassess the costs and needs of the public school system to continue
providing for constitutionally mandated quality education. 12 3 The
legislature provided for these funding assessments to be accomplished by the newly created quality schools interim committee,
made up of members of congress and state education officials,
which was directed to establish a preliminary funding structure in
line with constitutional quality in education by December 1, 2005,
to meet immediate educational needs. 124 In addition to promulgating these standards in line with the Montana Constitution's
promise of quality education, the 59th Legislature's Regular Session attempted to materially bring the public school system within
the boundaries of quality by increasing K-12 school funding by $88
million, and to fund the Montana Constitution's American Indian
education mandate by allocating $3.5 million to Indian cultural
12 5
curricula for all students.
By the end of the regular legislative session, however, all of
the State's educational goals had not been accomplished by the
legislature. The quality schools interim committee had not agreed
on a funding formula, funding for teacher recruitment and retention had not been addressed, and teacher benefits and the teacher
retirement system were under-funded. 2 6 Therefore, on December
15, 2005, Governor Schweitzer called for the meeting of a special
session of the state legislature to address these issues as well as to
appropriate one-time money from the general fund to establish
foundational curricula for Indian education for all Montana students, as required by Article X, Section 1(2) of the Montana Constitution, and one-time money to establish a foundation for school
weatherization, maintenance, and "utility and transportation energy costs."' 2 7 All of the Governor's goals for convening the special session were accomplished, as directed by the Governor,

123. Id. § 20-9-309(4)-(5).
124. 2005 Mont. Laws 1284.
125. Proclamation of Governor Brian Schweitzer, Office of the Governor of the State of
Montana, Call to the 59th Legislature for a Special Session (Dec. 15, 2005), available at
http://data.opi.mt.gov/bills/Specsess/1205/HJrnl/HJ011214.pdf.
126. Id. at 2-3.
127. Id. at 3.
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under a balanced budget without the necessity of raising taxes. 12 8
The Governor signed into law Representative Wanzenreid's "Appropriate Funds for Schools" bill, providing for one time monies to
pay for school weatherization, Indian education for all and closing
the Indian achievement gap in schools, special education, and
teacher retirement funds. 12 9 The Governor also signed into law
the "Governor's School Funding Proposal," sponsored by Senator
Don Ryan, which included further appropriations for those quality
oriented programs established by the regular session, as well as
establishing a funding calculation scheme for educational programs in line with quality. 130 The amount appropriated by the
special session of the legislature totaled $200 million dollars, all
31
under a balanced budget.
Between the Montana Supreme Court's decision in Columbia
Falls Elementary and the legislature's immediate action in the
regular and special sessions of 2005, a legal standard based in
Montana children's constitutional rights to a quality education
and an education informed by the Native culture unique to this
state has been established. For the first time, Montana citizens
can rely on an articulated and reliable standard for the level of
quality and cultural content to which their children are entitled.
And for the first time, the state legislature has created a minimum level of support which they must provide, and for which they
must be held accountable. However, as of January 2006, the educational groups that brought the action against the State in Columbia Falls Elementary were not satisfied with the legislature's
response, believing the increased funding to be too little to address
current problems in school administration, and too little to satisfy
the constitutional mandate. 132 The Governor responded, stating
that the funds are adequate, and the State will not likely increase
expenditures on K-12 education in the next legislative session as
there are other state projects in need of attention. 133 Although the
Governor has urged critics of the 2005 legislation to seek a remedy
at the legislative level, even though, curiously, he has indicated
there will be insufficient monies to support the desired increase,
the Columbia FallsElementary plaintiffs have indicated that they
128. Jon Tester, Special Session a Success for Montana, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Dec. 22,

2005) at 5A.
129. H.B. 1, 59th Leg., Spec. Sess. (Mont. 2005) (enacted).
130. S.B. 1, 59th Leg., Spec. Sess. (Mont. 2005) (enacted).
131. Tester, supra note 128.
132. Schweitzer Angers Education Groups, BILLINGS GAZETrE, Jan. 27, 2006, at 6B.
133. Id.
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will assess the legislature's action on education funding in the
2007 legislative session, and are prepared to begin litigation anew
if new funding is not allocated to remedy remaining educational
deficiencies. 134
Nicole Ducheneaux
5.

TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND SURETY Co. v. RIBI IMMUNOCHEM
35
RESEARCH, INC.1

In Travelers Casualty and Surety Co. v. Ribi Immunochem
Research, Inc., the Montana Supreme Court addressed whether a
comprehensive general liability (CGL) policy provides coverage for
environmental damage caused by the insured's intentional disposal of hazardous wastes into a landfill, thereby unintentionally
contaminating the groundwater. In answering this question, the
court addressed an issue of first impression, which is the focus of
this comment: which party bears the burden of proving that an
13 6
exception to a coverage exclusion applies?
Ribi Immunochem Research, Inc. (Ribi) is a Hamilton, Montana, corporation that develops biopharmaceutical products.
From 1981 to 1985, Ribi employees transported Ribi's hazardous
wastes to the Bitterroot Valley Sanitary Landfill (the Landfill)
and poured them directly into an open, unlined, earthen pit on a
monthly basis. 137 Although Ribi understood the hazardous nature
of the products it was depositing, it hoped that the waste would
mostly evaporate before seeping though the Landfill into the
groundwater. 138 In reality, the wastes migrated very quickly into
the groundwater. 139 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
discovered the contamination in 1987, and the National Institute
of Health (NIH) excavated and cleaned the contaminated soil and
140
groundwater soon after.
In 1993, property owners near the Landfill sued Ribi for personal injury and property damage. 14 1 In 1997 the State sued Ribi
to recover costs arising from the contamination, and in 1998 the
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
2005 MT 50, 326 Mont. 174, 108 P.3d 469.
Id.
28.
Id. 918.
Id.
Id.
Id.
9.
Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co., 919.
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United States sued to recover NIH's cleanup costs. 142 All three
claims were eventually settled, and Ribi looked to its insurer,
Travelers Casualty and Surety Co. (Travelers), for indemnification under its CGL policy. 143 Travelers denied coverage based on
the CGL policy's standard pollution exclusion, which excludes
"property damages arising out of the disposal of hazardous wastes
into or upon the land" after an "occurrence." 14 4 Travelers then
brought an action seeking a declaration that its denial of coverage
1 45
was proper.
Under the CGL policy, an accident that results in property
damage "neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the
insured" is an "occurrence."1 4 6 The Montana Supreme Court
agreed with Travelers that the district court erred in determining
that this "expected nor intended" language represents an exclusion to coverage.1 47 Instead, the court held that this language
"provides a grant of coverage and that Ribi, as the insured seeking
coverage, must prove that the damages arising from its disposal of
hazardous wastes were 'neither expected nor intended."' 148 Thus,
the burden was on Ribi to prove that its claim arose from an "occurrence."
The district court found that, although Ribi clearly intended
to dispose the hazardous wastes in the Landfill for an extended
period of time, the parties disputed whether Ribi intended or expected the resulting damages.1 4 9 The Montana Supreme Court
viewed this disagreement and the resulting damages from the
standpoint of the insured, and assumed for its purposes that an
"occurrence" took place. 150
Although the dumping constituted an "occurrence," Ribi did
not necessarily qualify for coverage due to the CGL policy's pollution exclusion.' 5 ' On the other hand, the pollution exclusion itself
contained an exception if the disposal was "sudden and accidental."1 5 2 In Sokoloski v. American West Insurance Company,1 5 3 the
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
10.
Id.
23.
Id.
12.
Id.
19.
Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co.,
19.
Id.
Id.
22.
Id.
Id.
Id. 24.
1999 MT 93, 294 Mont. 210, 980 P.2d 1043.
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Montana Supreme Court held that, in the context of a homeowner's policy, the word "sudden" includes a temporal element
since the word "accidental" already expresses the element of "unexpectedness." 154 The court also held that the failure to show one
condition - either sudden or accidental - negates the exception to
the pollution exclusion. 155 In other words, if the disposal of hazardous wastes is not sudden and accidental, the pollution exclusion applies and coverage may be denied. The court extended
Sokoloski's holding to the standard pollution exclusion in Ribi's
15 6
CGL policy.
Prior to Ribi, the question of which party bears the burden of
proving an exception to an exclusion applies had not been addressed in Montana.15 7 The Montana Supreme Court noted that
"[ciourts generally allocate the respective burdens of proof to the
insured and insurer consistent with the basic distinction between
coverage clauses and exclusionary clauses."'15 The insured must
prove that there was an "occurrence" and that it is covered, while
the insurer must prove the applicability of an exclusionary
clause. 59 The court observed that courts are split regarding the
burden of proving an exception to an exclusion, but the majority of
courts place the burden on the insured. 160 In support of its holding to do the same, the court noted that this allocation places the
burden of proving applicability on the party seeking the benefit of
16
the particular policy provision. '
The "sudden and accidental" pollution exception "creates coverage for environmental contamination where it otherwise would
not exist.' 6 2 This exception benefits the insured because it expands coverage, and thus the insured bears the burden of proving
that a disposal of hazardous waste was "sudden and accidental."
In reaching this conclusion, the court observed that if the burden
were on the insurer to disprove the exception, it would force the
insurer to prove a negative despite the fact that the insured possesses the relevant information pertaining to its own activities. 163
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
15.
Id.
Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co.,
Id. %28.
Id.
29.
Id.
Id.
30 (emphasis added).
Id.
Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co.,
Id. 32 (emphasis added).

26.

31.
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This would be unfair and would impose an undue burden on the
insurer, because it would require an insurer "to discover independently evidence of an insured's sudden and accidental disposal of
pollutants."16 4 Accordingly, the court concluded "that Ribi had the
burden of proving that its disposal of hazardous wastes into the
groundwater of neighboring properties was 'sudden and acciden65
tal.,"1
Jeffrey T. Dickson

164. Id.
165. Id.
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